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CONTROL OF SPACE SHUTTLE MAINTENANCE COST BY THE APPLICATION OF AIRLINE METHODS
R. S. Williams
Manager, Engineering
Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Jamaica, New York
ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to relate certain areas of 
similarity between Space Shuttle operation and 
Airline operation. The design controlled 
factors affecting airline maintenance cost are 
discussed. The thesis is that the Space Shuttle 
designer should consider airline experience in 
areas affecting maintenance cost in order to 
design the most cost effective Space Shuttle 
System.
INTRODUCTION
The primary goal of the Space Shuttle is the 
ability to put men and material into an earth 
orbit and return them to earth with safety, 
schedule reliability and at low cost. There 
is no doubt that NASA working with the aero­ 
space industry can accomplish the first two, 
that is to operate with safety and schedule 
reliability. It is the third to operate "At 
Low Cost" which will present the greatest 
challenge.
There are many similarities between Space Shuttle 
and Airline Operation. For that reason, a look 
at the airline approach to control of recurring 
costs should be of value to the Space Shuttle 
designer. Maintenance cost for Pan Am for 
various aircraft varies between 21% and 33% of 
overall operating cost and it is not unreason­ 
able to assume that this percentage will be 
higher on the Space Shuttle because it is the 
first reuseable space system to be built. 
Control of Maintenance cost, therefore, can have 
considerable impact on Space Shuttle recurring 
costs.
Airline experience indicates four major areas 
which must be considered during preliminary de­ 
sign if maintenance cost is to be controlled. 
They are:
1. Fault detection and isolation
2. Redundancy
3. Maintainability
4. A comprehensive maintenance program
Fault Detection and Isolation
The Space Shuttle will be far too complex to be 
designed for zero failure. Once we accept this 
we then must design to allow for mechanical 
failures and system deterioration. Systems must 
be designed so that failures can be detected and 
isolated in a minimum of time. In fact we must 
go further than just the detection of failures. 
We must be able to detect deterioration and pre­ 
dict failures. This will allow insipient pro­ 
blems to be corrected by preventive maintenance 
before an actual failure occurs.
The airlines have concentrated on self-contained 
fault isolation equipment. The basic specifi­ 
cation on the B747 was written to include on­ 
board fault isolation in all flight critical 
systems. This is particularly adaptable to 
electronic systems and most LRU's include fault 
indicator lights and fault isolation logic built 
directly into the component. Where there are 
several closely interrelated components in a 
system which makes fault isolation difficult, 
the approach is to check complete system opera­ 
tion with on-board check-out equipment. An 
example is the aircraft system for determining 
gross weight and center of gravity location. On 
command the computer in this system injects a 
signal which checks all of the components, wiring 
and connectors and isolates the fault to zones 
allowing quick component change to correct the 
problem. The pay off has been in fewer uncon­ 
firmed removals and shorter maintenance down 
time.
Based on airline experience, when self-contained 
fault isolation is not installed:
1. More complex G.S.E. and software are required 
for fault isolation.
2. Troubleshooting time is extended with re­ 
sultant delays in vehicle release from 
maintenance.
3. Fault isolation is less accurate where 
intermittent faults are involved.
All of these increase maintenance cost without 
a corresponding increase in reliability.
The Space Shuttle must have as a design goal 
inclusion of on-board self-test equipment in all 
systems and components if maintenance cost and 
down time are to be minimized.
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Redundancy Maintainability
With today's "state of the art" it is not 
possible to detect and correct each incident of 
deterioration before a system or component 
failure results. Therefore, in order to insure 
mission reliability, redundancy as well as re­ 
liability must be designed into the system. The 
depth and type of redundancy required depends on 
system criticality. But in all cases redundancy 
must be carefully weighed against increased re­ 
liability requirements because maintenance costs 
rise sharply as reliability requirements in­ 
crease. This is brought about by:
1. More rigid control of shop limits
2. More exhaustive testing requirements
3. Higher level of technician capability and 
training
4. More sophisticated shop equipment and clean­ 
liness
System reliability through redundancy with a 
lower order of reliability can result in a lower 
acquisition and maintenance cost.
"Designed-In" redundancy allows airlines to 
dispatch aircraft with systems or portions of 
systems inoperative. This increases schedule 
reliability and reduces maintenance cost by 
allowing repairs to be delayed until a time when 
parts and man power are available. It is 
doubtful that this procedure will be applicable 
to the Space Shuttle during the early stages of 
operation. As operating experience and con­ 
fidence increase, it may well be the most cost 
effective approach.
In airline parlance, redundancy does not 
necessarily mean that two, three or four identi­ 
cal systems are installed with all except one on 
standby ready to take over if a failure should 
occur. This type of redundancy is used in 
flight critical systems such as the autopilot, 
autoland and inertial navigation systems but for 
less critical system redundancy may take one of 
several forms:
1. In modern aircraft structure due to multiple 
load paths there is no single point failure 
which will be catastrophic. For example, 
if the lower cord of a wing spar fails 
flight loads will be carried by stringers 
and wing skin. This reduces the margin of 
safety but still allows safe flight.
2. In instrumentation pressure indicators are 
backed up with pressure warning lights so 
that if either is inoperative mission re­ 
liability is not effected.
3. In engine instrumentation several parameters 
are monitored, due to the interrelation of 
these parameters, one or more may be inoper­ 
ative without jeopardizing engine operation.
Maintainability in most cases is the judicious 
application of engineering know how, experience 
and common sense. Basically this means to design 
for simplicity, accessibility, quick replacement 
and rapid system revalidation after a fault has 
been corrected. If maintainability is not con­ 
sidered in preliminary design, an aircraft or the 
Space Shuttle, for that matter, cannot be main­ 
tained at low cost. Retrofit to obtain main­ 
tainability is extremely costly. In all aircraft 
acquisitions, and this includes the Shuttle 
vehicles, the customer must be deeply involved in 
the preliminary design process to determine that 
maintainability is not lost in the trade off f s 
with weight, cost and production convenience. 
Because it is the customer who must pay for 
maintenance.
A look at the procurement of the B747 from Boeing 
will illustrate how an airline injects its re­ 
quirements into the design to obtain maintain­ 
ability. After a feasibility study and high level 
agreement that Pan Am was interested in such an 
aircraft, Boeing submitted the B747 Basic Speci­ 
fication for review. It was at this point that 
Engineering and Maintenance made a concentrated 
input to insure maintainability. The changes to 
the Basic Specification requested by Pan Am read 
like a textbook in maintainability. These 
changes were based on Engineering analysis and 
application of experience with earlier aircraft. 
A review of that document would be of interest to 
all who are involved in the Space Shuttle pro­ 
curement process.
After contract signing the "Detail Specification" 
became the controlling document for the aircraft. 
This specification is still maintained although 
it has been revised 32 times since the original 
issue. It now reflects our requirements for a 
second group of B747's which are being delivered 
later this year. The Basic Specification never 
remains firm for long. It is continually in a 
state of change. These changes fall into two 
categories:
1. Those changes initiated by the manufacturer 
as a product improvement. Some of these are 
incorporated at no cost to the customer but 
others may involve increased cost or penal­ 
ties in performance or weight.
2. Those changes requested by the customer. 
They usually reflect service experience on 
the aircraft in operation or are the result 
of research and development by the airline 
or component manufacturers.
In all changes, maintainability is given con­ 
sideration.
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Pan Am invested over 100 Engineering and 
Maintenance man years during the four year 
development and procurement process of the B747 
but still there were many details which escaped 
maintainability scrutiny. Some examples will 
help to clarify this point:
1. When the JT9D engine was designed for the 
B747, 21 horoscope holes were installed. 
These holes allow inspection of the sus­ 
pected trouble areas inside the engine. 
When Boeing installed the auxiliary equip­ 
ment on the engine such as plumbing, ducts, 
pumps, etc., 14 of the 21 holes were ob­ 
structed. We now must remove equipment to 
gain access to these 14 inspection holes. 
If maintainability had been given proper 
consideration this would not have occurred.
2. The B747 is equipped with upper and lower 
rudders for redundancy. At higher speeds 
less rudder travel is required. To accom­ 
plish this a Rudder Ratio Changer has been 
installed to vary the amount of rudder de­ 
flection as an inverse function of airspeed. 
This system contains two control units, two 
actuators and one comparator. The actuator 
motor is designed to operate from the fully 
extended position of 141 knots to the fully 
retracted position at 359 knots and the 
motor is stalled, at the end of actuator 
travel, at all other times. On the ground, 
with inadequate cooling, heat build up from 
the stalled mo'tor overheats the lubricant 
in the motor bearings and the motor fails. 
Add to this the requirement for a 40 foot 
work stand to change the actuator and you 
have a perfect example of maintainability 
not being considered in design.
Maintenance Program
The last design consideration and for sure the 
most misunderstood is the maintenance program. 
Airlines have experienced a major evolution in 
maintenance philosophy during the past decade. 
One of the most important facets has been the 
change from a fixed time between overhauls to 
"on-condition" maintenance. "On-condition" 
means that the inspection, check and replacement 
of a component or system and the extent of re­ 
furbishment and testing required is best deter­ 
mined by the condition of that component or 
system. System condition is determined by one 
or more of the following:
1. Flight Crew Observations
2. On-Board Monitoring
3. Visual Checks
4. Ground Checks using Aircraft Instruments
5. Ground Checks using Ground Test Equipment
6. Non-Destructive Testing
7. Monitoring and Analysis of Performance Data
In the development of a maintenance program there 
are certain concepts which should be understood.
1. Safety is not a negotiable item. There are 
minimum safety standards established by the 
airline and by federal regulations which 
must be complied with. Safety is of prime 
importance in any acceptable maintenance 
program.
2. Maintenance which is not required not only 
imposes an economic penalty but degrades 
reliability. A few years ago when major 
overhauls were accomplished on aircraft, the 
trouble rate was invariably highest during 
the first 200 to 300 flight hours after re­ 
lease from overhaul. This resulted from in­ 
fant mortality of overhauled units installed 
as well as from problems introduced by in­ 
attention to details or slips in quality 
control.
3. The maintenance program and the compatibility 
of the aircraft to that program must be 
developed and confirmed before the aircraft 
reaches the operational stage.
A look at the B747 Maintenance Program and its 
development should be of value during the pro­ 
curement phase of the Space Shuttle. Working 
with other airlines and with the FAA, a pre­ 
liminary maintenance plan for the B747 has been 
established. Structural inspection items are 
all on a sampling basis. Feedback from inspection 
findings to the system establishes the frequency 
and number of future inspections. Component 
removals are not specified by fixed time between 
overhaul but rather a procedure has been estab­ 
lished where system and components will be 
monitored for condition and the feedback will 
determine if a fixed time between removal is 
required .
The removal of a component from the aircraft is 
scheduled when deterioration occurs as evidenced 
by monitoring or when a malfunction renders the 
unit partially or totally inoperative. Once the 
component is removed, the shop processing is of 
importance to reliability as well as cost. With 
rare exception, we no longer overhaul components. 
By overhaul we mean to return the component to 
original manufacturers specifications in all areas. 
Rather than overhaul, we repair the trouble re­ 
ported and refurbish those areas which are known 
to be subject to wear or deterioration.
The work required on a component when it reaches 
the shop is determined by the information obtained 
from monitoring, from flight crew reports, from 
the mechanic removing the component and by a pre- 
service test of the component. The pre-service 
test is made primarily to determine if the unit 
has actually failed and if so, to define what is 
required to restore the unit to an airworthy con­ 
dition. The component is then repaired to the
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extent necessary to correct the problem found, 
tested, and put in stock for reinstallation. 
During shop repair, service limits are used and 
components are not normally returned to original 
design specifications. The component is tested 
only to the extent necessary to check the work 
that was done and the affect that work would have 
on the rest of the component. The rationale 
behind this is as follows: Consider a complex 
component with many parts - when a single part 
fails, the component malfunctions. If the part 
had not failed, the component would have con­ 
tinued to function normally. Therefore, re­ 
placement of the failed part and testing component 
operation is all that is necessary to restore this 
complete component to an airworthy condition.
Since the change from a "Fixed Time" to an 
"on-condition" Maintenance Program on the 707 and 
727 aircraft, Pan Am has experienced no increase 
in flight crew reported items, there has been no 
increase in the delay rate, and overall component 
unscheduled removal rate has been reduced. In 
addition to the reduction of the unscheduled com­ 
ponent removals, all scheduled removals for com­ 
ponents which are "on-condition" have been 
eliminated. This has reduced maintenance cost 
significantly. In 1969 approximately 18,000 
component time limit removals were eliminated. 
The reduced shop workload amounted to an esti­ 
mated $2,200,000 for material and $3,800,000 for 
labor. The reduced aircraft workload for removal 
and installation of the components is estimated 
at $575,000 for a total 1969 savings of over 
$6,500,000. Although no dollar figure has been 
assigned, it also resulted in reduced aircraft 
down time.
The maintenance plan contains servicing items such 
as lubrication, area inspection, fluid quantity 
checks, tire pressure checks and so forth which 
are specified at fixed times. But even these 
times are negotiable and during the first year of 
operation we have extended and reduced many of 
these service periods to fit the needs of the 
system.
We maintain aircraft by monitoring operation, 
inspecting the airframe, engines and systems, and 
by giving them all a good "letting alone". In 
one sentence, that outlines the Modern Airline 
Maintenance Philosophy and we predict that it 
will some day be the basic maintenance plan of a 
"Low Maintenance Cost" Space Shuttle.
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